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Abstract 
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment2 (Stockholm Conference) 
was the first of many international negotiations to consider the effects of anthropogenic 
interference with the environment, including chemical pollution and climate change. The 
Conference and its corresponding declaration recognised customary International 
Environmental Law (IEL) principles, such as the precaution and prevention principles, and has 
no doubt been a catalyst for an increased awareness of environmental issues throughout the 
globe, thus influencing domestic environmental legal systems. The UN climate regime can 
therefore be seen not only as a source of international law, but as an influence on national 
and transnational environmental regulatory systems. However, the question remains as to the 
actual impact, if any, IEL has had in protecting the global environment and preventing 
dangerous climate change. 
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Introduction  
                                                        
1 Lydia obtained a first class LLB Hons and was awarded the Wolferstan’s prize for the Best Law 
Graduate and is currently undertaking the combined LL.M and LPC at the University of Law in Exeter. 
She has secured a training contract with Slee Blackwell Solicitors based in the southwest and starts 
work with them in August 2017. 
2 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, (‘Stockholm 
Declaration’), Stockholm, June 1972  
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The 1972 Stockholm Conference was the first to address global problems such as chemical 
pollution, climate change and other threats to the environment. Principle 1 of the resulting 
Stockholm Declaration states the common conviction that 
Man has the fundamental right to…adequate conditions of life in an environment of a 
quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility 
to protect and improve the environment.3  
 
Whilst this statement expresses a clear duty to protect the environment, the anthropocentric 
idea that the environment need only be protected where it affects the rights of man seriously 
limits its scope. Commentators note that most principles in the Stockholm Declaration are 
largely aspirational rather than mandatory and few impose clear duties on states.4 
 
Environmentalists have argued that the bold statements made in the Stockholm Declaration 
were not reiterated in the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(the Rio declaration)5. Greenpeace has stated: ‘The Rio Declaration provided the world with a 
bag of ‘principles’ that are regressive, fragmented, or seriously devoid of vision.’6 However, 
the Stockholm Conference created the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to 
assess environmental trends and conditions towards the goal of strengthening and developing 
international instruments and institutions for the ‘wise management’ of the environment7.  
Since IEL negotiations began, UNEP has played an important co-ordinating function. 
 
The 1992 Rio negotiations resulted in a number of notable outcomes that will be referred to 
throughout this article. The main legal and policy focus of this article is the Rio Declaration8 
and the UNFCCC: the former as it expressly considered the balance between environment 
and development, reinforcing generally accepted principles of environmental law,9 and the 
latter, which is possibly the most important legal outcome, as it continues to work as the centre 
of gravity for climate change negotiations.  
 
                                                        
3 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, (‘Stockholm 
Declaration’), Stockholm, June 1972, Principle 1.  
4 Bell., and McGillivray, D., Environmental Law, (2013) at p.150. 
5 Rio Declaration to Environment and Development, (‘Earth Summit’), Rio de Janeiro, June 1992 
6 Greenpeace., ‘The Rio Declaration – Stepping Backwards’, Earth Summit Press Pack (1992), p.1 
http://www.uow.edu.au/~sharonb/STS300/sustain/summit/critiques/article3.html accessed January 
2016. 
7 United Nations Environment Programme, About UNEP, (no date) http://www.unep.org/about/ 18 
January 2016. 
8 Rio Declaration to Environment and Development, (‘Earth Summit’), Rio de Janeiro, June 1992 
9 such as the prevention principle (Principle 2), the precaution principle (Principle 15) and the polluter-
pays principle (Principle 16). 
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The Convention established three bodies; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) a consensus based scientific body which issues reports and advice, the UNFCCC 
Secretariat and the Conference of the Parties (COP). The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC 
is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations ‘at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’10: subsequently the 1997 Kyoto Protocol11 
was the first major product of the UNFCCC process.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol set binding targets for emissions reduction in developed countries. The 
compliance mechanism was the strongest in any multilateral environmental agreement to date 
and focused on targets based on total emissions per country, rather than per capita. To 
facilitate compliance, the Protocol codified a binary split of Annex 1 (developed) and non-
Annex 1 (developing) Parties as had been agreed under the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) in 1992.12 As historically the majority of greenhouse gas 
emissions came from Annex 1 countries, the Treaty required commitment from them to 
assume the burden of climate change and to ‘promote, facilitate and finance…developing 
country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention’.13 Emerging 
economies such as China, India and Brazil were under no quantified obligation to reduce 
emissions. Furthermore, the Protocol did not enter into force for eight years. By which time it 
was evident that the Protocol was insufficient to control the concentrations of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere, 14  primarily because emerging economies such as China and 
Singapore had grown significantly in both wealth and emissions.15  
 
According to Prost, some developing countries have been reluctant to adopt and enforce 
environmental laws due to a lack of capacity and will, ‘content to sacrifice more of their 
environmental protection in the pursuit of their development goals’16 despite being those most 
likely to ‘suffer the most from climate change’s adverse effects’.17 The issue of CBDR has 
troubled negotiators since the signing of the UNFCCC treaty in 1992 and is a major factor in 
why many consider the Kyoto Protocol to be void. 
                                                        
10 Ibid., Article 2 
11 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘Kyoto Protocol’), 
Kyoto, December 1997 
12 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York City, May 1992, Article 3 
13 Ibid., Article 4 
14 Dupy, P,. and Viñuales, J., International Environmental Law, (2015), p.149 
15 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook - Recovery Strengthens, Remains Uneven, 
(2014), table B1 
16 Prost, M., and Camprubi, A., ‘Against fairness? International environmental law, disciplinary bias 
and Pareto Justice’, (2012), Lieden Journal of International Law, p. 384 
17 Ibid., p. 394 
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The Copenhagen Accord 
The impending expiry of the Kyoto Protocol and the fourth IPCC assessment report which 
confirmed that ‘warming of the climate system is unequivocal’18, led to the Copenhagen Accord 
of 2010 (COP15). 19  The Conference sought commitments from both developed and 
developing countries as agreed under the Roadmap of the 2007 Bali Action Plan,20 noted by 
Bondansky as ‘a major reorientation of the climate change negotiations’21. Leaders agreed to 
prevent the estimated temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius with an option to revise the target 
to 1.5 degrees in 2014. At the time, academics believed the Accord would provide ‘the first 
realistic hope in many years that an effective global climate regime can be constructed’.22 
However, some considered that the conference ‘epitomized the failure of international 
responses to climate change’23 because negotiators failed to come to any decision as to how 
the goal should be reached. 
 
The debate on the issue of CBDR is arguably the cause for the collapse of the Copenhagen 
Accord, as developing countries were understandably concerned that the allocation of 
responsibility would not allow them to develop sufficiently. For example, consider Figure 1 
which shows that in order to successfully limit the risk of exceeding a global temperature 
increase of 2 degrees Celsius and in order to meet the COP21 goal of reaching peak 
emissions in 2020 before declining to 50 per cent lower than 1990 levels, developing countries 
would be required to suffer a much greater sacrifice than developed countries.24  
 
 
                                                        
18 IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, p.2. 
19 Copenhagen Accord to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
(‘Copenhagen Accord’), Copenhagen, December 2009 
20 The Bali Roadmap to the United Nations framework Convention on climate Change (COP13), Bali, 
December 2007. 
21 Bondansky, D., ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Post-Mortem’, (2010) University 
of Georgia School of Law, p.2. 
22 Antypas, A., ‘The Copenhagen Accord: Inclusive, meaningful and an important step forward’, 
(2009) 295 Environmental Law and Management, p.1. 
23 Mayer, B., ‘Climate Change and International Law in the Grim Days’, (2013) 24 European Journal 
of International Law, p. 948. 
24 ‘Kartha, S., Siebert, et al., R., ‘A Copenhagen Prognosis: Towards a Safe Climate Future’, The 
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Stockholm Environment Institute, (2009), p.9. 
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Figure 1. The red line shows a global 800 GtCO2 pathway, the blue pathway shows 
industrialised (Annex 1) countries’ emissions declining more than 50 per cent below 1990 
levels by 2020, and to zero by 2050. The green line shows, by subtraction, the severely 
restricted emissions path that would remain for developing countries. 
 
In 2011, The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) 
(established at COP17) launched a work plan to enhance mitigation and to close the gap 
between Parties. It was considered to be a turning point in IEL negotiations as it recognised 
that mitigation efforts by developed countries alone would not be enough to tackle climate 
change. The phrase ‘CBDR’ was subsequently rephrased in the 2014 Lima negotiations 
(COP20), to ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of 
different national circumstances’.25 This new phrase addresses the issues around the debate 
of the 1992 CBDR by abolishing the distinction between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 parties. 
 
The Rio Summit in 2012 (Rio+20) shifted the focus from environmental protection to 
sustainable development in light of evidence from the IPCC that global warming was 
attributable to human activity. The IPCC has delivered five assessment reports since its 
development in the 1970s, each one noting more and more evidence of the ‘discernible human 
influence on global climate’.26 Its most recent report,27 the IPCC stated that atmospheric 
                                                        
25 United Nations Climate Change Conference, (‘Lima Call for Climate Action’), COP20, Lima, 
December 2014, para.3. 
26 IPCC, 1995: The Science of Climate Change. In: Climate Change 1995. Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, p.5, 
para 2.4. 
27 IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
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concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased to unprecedented levels28 and made it 
clear that ‘limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained reductions of GHG 
emissions’.29 It is perhaps in light of these findings that the latest negotiations at COP21 have 
focused primarily on emissions reduction. COP21 saw parties agree to limit global warming to 
2 degrees between 2015-2100. In order to reach this target, it was agreed that emissions must 
be cut by 40-70 per cent by 2050 and carbon neutrality must be reached by the end of the 
century.  
 
Developments in IEL Since Copenhagen 
In November 2014, the US – China Joint Announcement on Climate Change saw President 
Obama and President Jinping reaffirm ‘the importance of strengthening bilateral cooperation 
on climate change’.30 This announcement signified clear progress in IEL, as the world’s two 
largest carbon emitters, whose disagreements resulted in the failure of the Copenhagen 
conference, affirmed that this would not happen again. At the time, commentators considered 
that the announcement ‘seems to embody a change of attitude and a new spirit of cooperation 
which could be of very real benefit as Paris 2015 approaches’.31 
 
Another key difference between COP15 and COP21 is the development of a new UN process 
of managing climate change. The introduction of Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDCs) signifies a new approach to managing climate change. It allows Parties to volunteer 
their own action plans at COP21 and has been described as ‘an impressive portfolio of 
potential investment opportunities that are good for each individual country and good for the 
planet’. 32  Furthermore, most countries submitted their INDCs before meeting in Paris, 
meaning much of the ‘heavy lifting’ of the agreement had already been done.  
 
However, while these goals may be easier for countries to achieve, it does not mean that the 
pledges made are sufficient in preventing the global temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius. At 
the time of writing, the UNFCCC report on the projections of the success of these INDCs show 
that the global trajectory of emissions would lead to a temperature rise of 2.7 to 3 degrees by 
                                                        
28 Ibid. p.11. 
29 Ibid. p.19. 
30 The White House, U.S. – China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, (2014), p.1. 
31 Clement-Davies, C., ‘How to train your dragon; China and the climate change harness’, (2014) 8 
International Energy Law Review, p.268. 
32 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN Climate Change Newsroom, (2015) 
http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/indcs-unprecedented-global-breadth-of-climate-action-
plans-ahead-of-paris/ 25 January 2016. 
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the end of the century.33 This shows that the 2 degree goal is achievable, but pledges made 
in INDCs must be strengthened in order to achieve it. 
 
A final aspect that has led to the success of COP21 is the major financial developments in 
clean technology over the past seven years. Since 2009, the cost of solar modules has fallen 
by 65-70 per cent. This rejects the common belief that converting to clean energy is 
economically impossible, and has no doubt influenced negotiators and investors to support 
energy transitions from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy. 
 
1 The EU, US and China on Environmental Law: Global Cooperation 
 
Domestic Introductions to Environmental Law 
The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 had a particular influence on the European Communities 
(EC), which issued a number of environmental policies in light of The Limits to Growth 
published by the Club of Rome.34 In 1973, the EC issued the first of seven Environmental 
Action Programmes (EAPs); this EAP35 argued that economic development and the protection 
of the environment are interdependent and recognised the benefits of the ‘prevention principle’ 
over the ‘polluter pays principle’ by seeking prevention, reduction and containment of 
environmental damage, conservation of an ecological equilibrium and rational use of natural 
resources. By 1975, the first legally binding instruments on an environmental issue were 
adopted by the EU in relation to water and waste management.36  
 
Before the EU, the US began adopting its environmental policing bodies.37 In 1970, the US 
established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to handle protection of public health 
and restoration of the natural environment with the power to intervene without invitation by 
state officials. In the landmark case of Massachusetts v EPA,38 eleven states39 argued that 
according to the Clean Air Act, it was the responsibility of the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions made by car traffic in the US. The case was taken to the Supreme Court, where it 
                                                        
33United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Analysis Note: National Contributions, 
Paris 2015 UN Climate Change Conference COP21, CMP11, (2016), p.2. 
http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/DP-INDC-EN.pdf 27 January 2016 
34 Meadows, D., Randers, J., et al., ‘The Limits to Growth’ (1972) 
35 Environmental Action Programme [1973] OJ C112/1. 
36 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012, C 326/01, 
Articles 115 and 352. 
37 The National Air Pollution Control Administration (1955) and The Federal Water Quality 
Administration (1965). 
38 Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency (2007) 549 US 497. 
39 Massachusetts, Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, 
Texas and Utah. 
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held a 5-4 majority in favour or Massachusetts. The court responded to the EPA’s argument 
that emissions from American traffic were ‘insignificant’ to the global issue of climate change 
by stating ‘a reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions 
increases, no matter what happens elsewhere’.40 Academics have considered that although 
there has been some pulling back by the US courts in more recent case law, the response of 
the court in this case ‘provided the legal base for the new administration to press ahead with 
an interventionist approach without the need to for further legislative backing’41. The judgment 
now stands as a precedent for legal action against other governments, such as those in the 
EU42. 
 
The history of China’s relationship between law and the environment is less straightforward. 
Although the Chinese government has made recent efforts to improve its environment and air 
quality, more than 90 per cent of Chinese people are regularly exposed to air pollution, which 
is responsible for 1.6 million deaths in China per year43. China’s poor air quality is a result of 
fast development and a history of environmentally devastating policy. For example, a recent 
study has considered the environmental impact of China’s Huai River Policy (HRP), a policy 
that had the goal of providing unlimited free heating to homes and offices in Northern China 
in winter months between 1950-1980, mostly from coal-fired boilers.44 The study found that 
incomplete combustion of coal in the boilers led to TSP concentrations 55 per cent higher than 
in Southern China, resulting in a 5.5 year reduction of life expectancy, incurring a total loss of 
2.5 billion life years.45 
  
In light of the health and human rights issues raised by these figures, and increased pressure 
from developed countries during negotiations, China’s environmental movement began in 
1989 when the Environment Protection Law46 (EPL) was passed. However, the EPL was not 
made ‘law’ until 2014.47 This 25 year gestation period reflects the time taken for the Chinese 
government to achieve consensus as to whether the country should prioritise economic growth 
over environmental protection, and the reactive rather than proactive nature of environmental 
                                                        
40 Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency (2007) 549 US 497, para.21-23. 
41 Carnwath, L., ‘Environmental Law in a Global Society’, (2015) Journal of Planning and Environment 
Law p. 278. 
42 Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands (2015) C/09/456689 HA ZA 131396. 
43 Rohde, R., Muller, R., ‘Air Pollution in China: Mapping of Concentrations and Sources’, Berkeley 
Earth, (2015), p.1. 
44 Chen, Y., Ebenstein, A., et al., ‘Evidence on the impact of sustained exposure to air pollution on life 
expectancy from China’s Huai River policy’, 110 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States of America, (2013). 
45 Ibid., p.6. 
46 Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (1989). 
47 Tianbao Q., ‘Research Handbook on Chinese Environmental Law’ (2015), p.397. 
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law. Since 1989, the EPL has been revised a number of times, resulting in the finished product 
having a more forceful position in transparency, liability, non-compliance and economic 
benefits. Legal practitioners believe that the revised document signals a recognition of the 
‘continued growing importance of environmental protection in the midst of economic 
development’;48 a promising step forward. 
 
States’ Contribution to Modern IEL 
The Kyoto Protocol showed major differences in commitment between the US, EU and China. 
Firstly, although China was a party to the Protocol, as a non-Annex 1 party it was placed under 
no binding targets or obligations. The US signed the Protocol in 1998, however, for 
involvement to become binding it had to first pass the Senate. In 1997 the Senate passed 
Byrd-Hagel Resolution which unanimously decided that the US should not ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol as the ‘disparity of treatment between Annex 1 parties and developing countries and 
the level of required emissions reductions, could result in serious harm to the United States 
economy’.49 Consequently, the US never ratified the Protocol, which seriously de-valued the 
Protocol’s worth. 
 
The EU signed and ratified the Protocol as an Annex 1 party and has continued its 
involvement, adhering to binding commitments in the second period and in 2003 established 
its Emissions Trading System (EU ETS),50 shortly followed by the Linking Directive51 which 
ensures compliance under the Clean Development Mechanism as agreed upon in the Kyoto 
Protocol.52 However, it soon became clear that the growing levels of emissions from the US, 
China and other developing countries would render the Protocol ‘increasingly ineffective’.53 
 
In a recent presentation, David Puttnam discussed the world’s historical reputation for 
pursuing economic gains over human interests.54 He mirrored examples such as the economic 
arguments not to abolish slavery to the economic arguments not to abolish fossil fuels, 
describing it as ‘a disregard for human suffering in the pursuit of profit’. He argues that over 
                                                        
48 Hogan Lovells, Clearing the Air on China’s New Environmental Protection Law, (2014) 
http://www.hoganlovells.com/clearing-the-air-on-chinas-new-environmental-protection-law-05-15-
2014/ 12 March 2016.  
49 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, (1997, 105th Congress, 1st Session, S.RES.98), para.11. 
50 Directive 2003/87/EC The EU Emissions Trading System Directive [2003] OJ L275. 
51 Directive 2004/101/EC The EU Emissions Trading System Linking Directive [2004] OJ L338. 
52 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘Kyoto Protocol’), 
Kyoto, December 1997, Article 12. 
53 Weiner, J., ‘Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of 
Global Environmental Law’, (2001) 27 Ecology Law Quarterly p.1363. 
54 Puttnam, D., ‘The Reality of Climate Change’, TEDx, YouTube, (2014). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBjtO-0tbKU 10 February 2016. 
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the years, this has been the same neglectful approach that has been made towards climate 
change, particularly by the US Bush administration in failing to sign the Kyoto Protocol. 
However, both countries have recently taken a more serious approach to IEL. 
 
For example, the Obama administration has spurred a new wave of environmental interest. 
The US-China Joint Announcement was arguably the catalyst for the unprecedented global 
involvement during the Paris negotiations and a huge step forward for global cooperation. 
Another promising announcement can be found in the 17th bilateral summit between the EU 
and China, where both countries adopted a joint statement on climate change, agreeing to 
‘work together to reach an ambitious and legally binding agreement at the Paris Climate 
Conference’.55 Commentators believe that while these announcements could be considered 
as mere ‘political window-dressing’,56 they highlight the ‘importance of working with the grain 
of market forces, rather than against it, to achieve the desired results’,57 a reminder of the 
importance of politics in constructing an effective legal agreement.  
 
Access to Justice and The Role of the Courts 
The issue of access to justice in environmental cases was addressed in UKELA’s 2015 Annual 
Garner Lecture. Thornton expressed concern over the so called ‘capture’ theory, explored by 
Keith Hawkins, whereby ‘an agency is co-opted by those it seeks to regulate, incorporating 
and reflecting their concerns into its decision making’58 and thus controlling the regulator, 
whereas members of the public with only a small financial stake cannot. This has resulted in 
an estimated 30,000 business lobbyists in Brussels working on behalf of their industries, 700 
environmental lobbyists and very few ordinary citizens lobbying for environmental causes.59 
Thornton argues that in order for environmental law to be effective, the ‘real clients of 
government should be the people they govern’60 i.e. the citizens who have placed them in 
power for the common good in order for that common good to be effective.  
 
Thornton drew comparison between two key cases that highlight this issue. The first, the US 
case of Marbury v Madison (1803)61 established that the Supreme Court had the ultimate 
                                                        
55 EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change, Belgium, June 2015, para.5. 
56 Clement-Davies, C., ‘How to Train Your Dragon; China and the Climate Change Harness’, (2014) 8 
International Energy Law Review, p.267. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Hawkins, K., Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution, 
(1984), p.3. 
59 Thornton, J., ‘Can we catch up? How the UK is falling behind on environmental law’, (2016) 27 
Environmental Law and Management, p. 194. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L Ed 60. 
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power to decide what the law is and to enforce it. This movement occurred much later in the 
UK, in the case of ClientEarth v Defra (2015)62 where ClientEarth sought to establish the right 
of the British people to breathe clean air. This case saw the court take a similar approach to 
Madison, by asserting its ‘authority to order the government to comply with its legal duty’ and, 
according to Thornton, ‘created a kind of continuing mandamus, fashioning a role for the courts 
to supervise compliance with the court’s order’, 63 representing a move away from the arbitrary 
exercise of power to which the UK has become accustomed.  
 
Despite this positive step in the UK, Thornton argues that a clear distinction remains between 
access to justice in the EU and access to justice in China and the US. Giving citizens and 
environmental organisations (such as ClientEarth) the right to submit complaints on non-
compliance was one of the objectives of the Aarhus Convention, to which the EU is a 
signatory. But as decisions are not legally enforceable, academics consider that ‘access to 
the European courts on environmental matters is de facto impossible for individuals and 
environmental organisations’.64 ClientEarth has brought the Commission before the Aarhus 
Convention Compliance Committee and is waiting for its response, although a decision that 
puts EU law ‘in the wrong’ is going to be unlikely.  
Thornton contrasts this with access to justice in the US, where the Clean Air and Clean Water 
Acts have a ‘private attorney general’ provision (allowing citizens to enforce the law) and the 
new approach to access to justice in China, where Article 6 of China’s EPL allows individuals 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to bring cases against polluting companies for 
the first time.65 He describes the new Chinese environmental movement as ‘a real game 
changer where citizens can sue companies in Chinese courts’.66  
 
On an international scale, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides access to justice to 
UN member states, rather than individuals. The ICJ hears disputes between states (only 
around three per year) and delivers Advisory Opinions by specialist UN agencies. In 1993, an 
Environmental Chamber was established. Disappointingly, the ICJ only had the opportunity to 
give judgment to two environmental cases before it was later dismantled.67 Commentators 
                                                        
62 ClientEarth v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2015] UKSC 28 
63 Thornton, J., ‘Can we catch up? How the UK is falling behind on environmental law’, (2016) 27 
Environmental Law and Management, p. 194. 
64 Krämer, L., EU Environmental Law, (2011) p.438. 
65 Article 6, Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (1989. 
66 Thornton, J., ‘Can we catch up? How the UK is falling behind on environmental law’, (2016) 27 
Environmental Law and Management, p.197. 
67 Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dam (1997) (Hungary v Slovakia) I.C.J Reports, 
1997, p7; Case concerning Pulp Mills of the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (2010) I.C.J 
Reports 2010, p.14. 
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consider that due to the mechanisms available in international law being under-utilized in the 
environmental sphere, ‘the extent to which they are appropriate for resolving international 
environmental disputes remains, perhaps at best, unclear.’68 Furthermore, only a third of UN 
member states have accepted its jurisdiction,69 meaning very little resort is ever made to the 
ICJ.  
 
The US has demonstrated its power in many international negotiations, environmental law 
being no exception. The world relies heavily on US involvement in IEL due to its strong political 
influence on emerging and developing economies, such as China. Despite being one of the 
world’s largest economies and emitting more carbon emissions than the EU and US 
combined,70 China is still a developing country71 and its responsibilities are commensurate 
with this status. However, in light of China’s recent economic growth and high levels of 
emissions, China’s involvement in IEL has never been more necessary. 
 
In terms of implementation and compliance, the EU has been the most successful of the three. 
This is perhaps because, unlike the US and China, the EU has always supported a rule-of-
law based system at an international level (for example in its internal binding targets and 
policies72). The EU could therefore be seen as a role model for other Parties to negotiations. 
A recent article by Belis et al supports this view. The article analysed the direct impact the EU 
may have on US international negotiations on environmental regulation and concluded that  
a closer look into US domestic debates on such regulation has indeed indicated that 
these debates take place within the shadow of the EU's environmental policies and 
standards and that this happens because the EU acts - intentionally or unintentionally 
- as a normative standard, a semi-hegemonic competitor, and an empirical touchstone 
in such debates.73  
 
IEL agreements will never be successful without the support and involvement of China, the 
US and the EU. The strengthening relationship between these parties shown in UNFCCC 
negotiations and bilateral agreements suggests a much more optimistic outlook for future IEL 
                                                        
68 Bell, S., McGillivray, D., Environmental Law (2013) p.156. 
69 two that have rejected its jurisdiction include China and the US - International Court of Justice, 
Jurisdiction, (no date) http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 17 March 2016. 
70 Boden, T.A., et al., ‘National CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement Manufacture, and 
Gas Flaring: 1751-2011’, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre, Oak Ridge National Labatory, 
U.S. Department of Energy. 
71 United Nations, Country Classification, (no date) 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.p
df 23 March 2016. 
72 see Directive 2003/87/EC The EU Emissions Trading System Directive [2003] OJ L275; Directive 
2004/101/EC The EU Emissions Trading System Linking Directive [2004] OJ L338. 
73 Belis, D., Joffe, P., et al., China, the United States and the European Union: Multiple Bilateralism 
and Prospects For a New Climate Change Diplomacy, (2015), 3 Climate and Carbon Law Review 
p.216. 
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decision making.  
 
2 Developing Countries and Environmental Law: Sustainable Development 
and Human Rights 
 
The Influence of Human Rights in IEL 
A study conducted by the UN on the relationship between human rights and the environment 
(the Analytical Study) considers three approaches to the relationship between human rights 
and the environment.74  The first suggests that the environment is ‘a precondition to the 
enjoyment of human rights’,75 underscoring the concept of environmental justice and the fact 
that a life of dignity is only possible where people have access to an environment with basic 
qualities. The second approach postulates that due to their ‘higher value’, human rights can 
be used as a tool to ‘achieve environmental protection’.76. The final approach ‘proposes the 
integration of human rights and the environment under the concept of sustainable 
development’77 and suggests that societal objectives must be treated in an integrated manner. 
The three approaches addressed in the Analytical Study will now be discussed in turn.  
 
Human Rights and Environmental Justice 
In a recent publication by Rhukus Ako, the author deliberates the global meaning of 
‘environmental justice’ and its links to human rights. Ako argues that there is a clear 
consistency in that definitions of environmental justice in both developed and developing 
countries make reference to ‘disadvantaged groups that should be protected from denied 
equal opportunities’. 78  A developed country example is the US. The US definition of 
environmental justice originated from ethnic minority campaigns against hazardous waste 
sites and the EPA’s definition: ‘the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people 
regardless of race, colour, national origin, culture… with respect to… the enforcement of 
environmental laws…’79  
 
Ako stresses the importance of this definition, as it highlights that ethnic minorities should not 
                                                        
74 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Analytical Study on the Relationship 
between Human Rights and the Environment, (December 2011), UN Doc. A//HRC/19/34 (OHCHR 
Analytical Study), p.4. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ako, R., Environmental Justice in Developing Countries: Perspectives from Africa and Asia-Pacific, 
(2013) p.2. 
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bear disproportionate burdens and that the communities likely to be impacted by 
environmental stress ought to be involved in the decision making process.80 As a developing 
country example, the South African interpretation of ‘environmental justice’ (as defined by 
APEN) seeks to ‘challenge the abuse of power which results in poor people having to suffer 
the effects of environmental damage caused by the greed of others’. 81  The term 
‘environmental justice’ is therefore relatively consistent in both developed and developing 
countries in that each definition makes reference to the importance of protecting indigenous 
or minority communities and considers that a healthy environment is a precondition to the 
enjoyment of human rights (supporting the first approach in the Analytical Study). Academics 
consider that while environmental legislation is not everything, it is an ‘important factor to 
distribute justice in society, to determine rights and obligations and to balance diverging 
interests’.82 However, due to the political nature of IEL it seems inevitable that environmental 
justice will always come second to Parties’ economic interests, no matter the threat to human 
rights.   
 
Human Rights to Achieve Environmental Protection 
Following the second approach of the Analytical Study to determine the nature of the 
relationship between human rights and the environment, it is necessary to discuss the role of 
the courts and how human rights may be used as a tool to achieve environmental protection. 
In Gabcikovo-Nagymaros the first predominantly environmental case brought before the ICJ, 
it was stated that ‘the protection of the environment is…a vital part of contemporary human 
rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health 
and the right to life itself’. 83 This case clarified that the protection of the environment is vital to 
‘specific’ environmental rights. However, environmental protection also has an indirect 
connection to more ‘general’ rights as a result of progressive interpretation by the courts. This 
was demonstrated in the case of Lopez Ostra where the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) found that the nuisance caused to Lopez by a waste treatment facility amounted to 
a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 84 . The African 
Commission has taken the connection between environmental protection and ‘general rights’ 
further, using cultural rights as a means to protect the environment and indigenous peoples in 
developing countries throughout Africa.85 
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These cases illustrate that human rights can work as an effective tool to ensure environmental 
protection in the courts. However, an alternative approach to IEL, often lobbied for by 
environmentalists and advocates of ‘deep ecology’ such as Bill Devall,86 is to award the 
environment ‘intrinsic rights’, unaffected by anthropocentric influences. The core principle of 
deep ecology is that the environment should be regarded as having inalienable legal rights; 
suggesting that IEL should not work to protect human rights, but should work to protect the 
environment itself.87 In a recent article, Susana Borras explores Devall’s theory and considers 
that despite the social impulse advocating the protection of the environment on its own terms, 
current environmental values have no intrinsic worth and are only protected because of their 
role in satisfying human needs. She argues that due to legal systems regarding nature as 
property rather than an ecological partner with its own rights,  
domestic laws and regulations on environmental protection effectively legalise 
environmental damage by regulating how much pollution of natural destruction of 
nature may lawfully occur’88.  
 
This raises questions as to whether current approaches to IEL through UN negotiations, 
domestic laws and through the international courts will ever be enough to protect the 
environment at the level required to prevent irreparable damage. Borras also considers that 
anthropocentricism may be a necessary part of environmental protection, ‘not because 
humanity is at the centre of the biosphere, but because humanity is the only species which 
possesses the consciousness to recognise and respect the morality of rights’.89 
 
An example of this eco-centric approach to environmental law can be found in the Ecuadorian 
Constitution which includes the ‘Rights of Nature’, providing that not only do people have the 
right to a healthy environment, but nature itself has ‘the right to exist’ and the ‘right to 
restoration’. 90 The implementation of the Rights of Nature in Ecuador continues to be widely 
debated, questioning the legitimacy of the 2008 Constitution. Some environmentalists 
consider that if Ecuador is unable to commit to protect nature’s right to persist and to be 
maintained, ‘the concept of granting essential rights to Nature should be reconsidered in terms 
of the real capacity and willingness of the State to respect them’.91  
 
                                                        
86 see Devall, B., Sessions, G., Deep Ecology, (1985). 
87 Ibid. 
88 Borras, S., ‘New Transitions from Human Rights to the Environment to the Rights of Nature’, (2016) 
5 Transnational Environmental Law, p.128. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Constitution of The Republic of Ecuador, the Official Register, October 2008, Article s71 and 72. 
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Sustainable Development and Environmental Responsibility 
This brings us to the issue of sustainable development and the third approach in the Analytical 
Study. Developing countries will need to continue to emit dangerous levels of GHG emissions 
in order to bring their citizens out of poverty and reach the economic stability of their developed 
neighbours. These rising emissions would make it impossible to stop dangerous climate 
change, as developed countries’ efforts alone are not sufficient. The key political problem for 
developing countries and their contribution to IEL is therefore how to reconcile environmental 
protection and economic development.  
 
The principle of sustainable development was introduced into mainstream discourse in the 
1987 Brundtland Report, which defined sustainable development as ‘development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs’ 92  and defined the ‘three pillars’ of sustainability; social, environmental and 
economic. International negotiations and global bodies tend to focus on one pillar in particular. 
However, to achieve sustainability, all three pillars must work together. The UN has sought to 
address this issue through a number of international agreements, notably the 1992 Rio 
Declaration,93 the Johannesburg Summit94 and Rio+2095; although academics consider that 
the idea of the three pillars being ‘effectively reconciled in practice – a ‘win’, win, win’ scenario 
– is inherently unconvincing’.96 
 
In the 1992 Rio Declaration, States officially committed to ‘the further development of 
international law in the field of sustainable development’97 and Agenda 21 confirmed that this 
involved ‘giving special attention to the delicate balance between environmental and 
developmental concerns’.98 The Johannesburg Declaration took this further99 and mandated 
the UN Commission on Sustainable Development to oversee its implementation. A recent 
survey by the UN department of economic and social affairs states that Rio+20 ‘reaffirmed 
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93 Rio Declaration to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (‘Earth 
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commitment to sustainable development and adopted a framework for action and 
comprehensive follow-up’.100 However, as the Rio Declaration was non-binding, it did not 
award the concept of ‘sustainable development’ a primary norm or principle in IEL. 
 
Furthermore, in the The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case the court observed that the ‘need to 
reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the 
concept of sustainable development’.101 Academics believe that this statement referred to the 
inclusiveness of the concept of sustainable development without giving it ‘the character of a 
primary norm or principle’.102 In his separate opinion, Judge Weeramantry challenged the 
conclusion, stating that sustainable development should be ‘more than a mere concept, but 
as a principle with normative value’.103 His position was confirmed in the Iron Rhine Arbitration 
where it was held that sustainable development ‘has now become a principle of general 
international law’.104  
 
In the more recent Pulp Mills case, 105  the ICJ returned to adopt the understanding of 
sustainable development expressed by the majority in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros. Academics 
therefore believe that although sustainable development is an element of the judicial 
reasoning process, ‘whether sustainable development can operate as a primary norm is still 
unsettled in general international law’.106 Despite efforts to promote sustainable development 
agendas, the legal status of sustainable development and the extent to which it can work to 
protect human rights and protect the environment remains unclear. In its conclusions, the 
Analytical Study recognises this and considers that each approach 
raise(s) salient questions concerning…the need for…a right to a healthy environment; 
the role and duties of private actors with respect to human rights and the environment; 
and the extraterritorial reach of human rights and environment…(and)… how to 
implement a rights-based approach to the negotiation…’107  
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Potential Emissions Reductions 
As discussed, since 1972 countries have debated what should guide the allocation of the 
burden that they should bear in addressing environmental protection and climate change. 
Traditionally, countries with the highest capacity and responsibility (i.e. developed countries) 
have been those to bear the burden of addressing climate change. However, countries with 
the highest capacity and historical responsibility are not necessarily those with the highest 
potential for emissions reductions. This is illustrated in Figure 2108 which shows a combination 
of developed and developing countries and their total CO2 emissions between 2000-2010. 
The graph illustrates that China is a developing country with a huge potential to reduce CO2 
emissions. China’s emissions have more than doubled in ten years, increasing by 5,184,360 
gigagrams of CO2. Africa and India’s CO2 emissions have also risen significantly, increasing 
by 511,289 and 713,490 gigagrams respectively. This equates to an increase of 6,409,139 
gigagrams in China, Africa and India between 2000-2010.109 An increase that could have been 
avoided had IEL and global cooperation been sufficient to come to an agreement that enabled 
developing country Parties to develop sustainably.  
Figure 2 
 
As discussed, there was optimism for the negotiations in Copenhagen to provide countries 
with the allocation of responsibility needed to reach the 2 degree target endorsed in Bali.110 
Yet no agreement could be reached, meaning China, India, Africa and other developing 
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countries continued to emit dangerous levels of CO2 emissions into the atmosphere from 2010 
onwards. Essentially, while negotiations have been taking place, world leaders have missed 
out on an opportunity to avoid a significant increase in global CO2 emissions.  
 
A major factor in the debate on environmental responsibility is the issue of loss and damage. 
For developed country Parties this has been the question of whether developing countries 
should be entitled to special aid in the event of climate related disasters and slow onset events. 
For developed country parties, this raised concerns of compensation and liability. Loss and 
damage has been lobbied for by SIDS since the beginning of UNFCCC negotiations111 but 
has been repeatedly shunned by developed country Parties who have historically taken 
charge in IEL negotiations.  
 
3 The Paris Agreement: New Approaches 
In light of the issues discussed, the key obstacles facing negotiators at COP21 were: legal 
structure, accountability and compliance, adaptation through finance in developing countries, 
loss and damage and of course emissions reductions. The methods used to address these 
issues and the anticipated success of these methods will be discussed in turn.  
 
Legal Structure & Accountability 
The Agreement boasts to be the first ‘legally binding and universal agreement on climate 
change’.112 Although, under more invasive scrutiny, the Agreement appears to be a hybrid of 
binding and non-binding elements; for example, the INDCs are non-binding, with no sanctions 
to come into play if they are breached. There has been much academic debate as to whether 
this really matters. After all, it is in the best interests of each country to fulfil the commitments 
made in INDCs, because international relations may suffer if responsibilities are not met. 
Moreover, while legally binding agreements have a number of advantages such as harsh 
compliance incentives and the ability to apply the commitments in domestic courts, they also 
present a number of difficulties. For example, agreements may become more difficult to 
negotiate, ambitions may be lowered to avoid costly commitments and participation may 
decrease (such as it did in the Kyoto Protocol where the US declined to participate). Bodansky 
considers that  
while there are good reasons to believe that legal form enhances compliance, other 
factors are also important… transparency and accountability mechanisms make it 
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more likely that poor performance will be detected and criticised.113  
It is perhaps for these reasons that Article 13 of the Paris Agreement introduces an enhanced 
transparency framework, requiring countries to submit ‘emissions inventories’ every two years 
and re-submit their INDCs every five years for peer review ‘in order to build mutual trust and 
confidence and to promote effective implementation’. Clement-Davies considers that relying 
on transparency and peer pressure to incentivize results, rather than sanctions for breaches 
‘should put pressure on all to keep strengthening their ambitions and refining their plans, taking 
account of new technology and fresh experience’. 114  In following a transparency and 
accountability framework rather than imposing legal obligations, the Agreement does not allow 
negotiations to repeat the setbacks of the past. 
 
Adaptation 
As discussed, the issue of climate finance has proved to be a controversial aspect in the 
debate on adaptation. Developed countries have historically preferred to use market 
mechanisms to mobilise financial support to developing countries, while developing countries 
would prefer finance to be donated to public funds for direct access. A pledge by developed 
countries to mobilise $100 billion of climate finance until 2025 was established in the 
Copenhagen Accord and later formalized in the Cancun Climate Change Conference 
(COP16).115 A recent study by the OECD assessed the global contribution to climate finance 
between 2013-2014 through bilateral and multilateral public and private finance.116 According 
to the study, while there has been significant progress made towards to $100 billion goal, the 
actual public and private finance mobilized between 2013-2014 is estimated to have been only 
$57 billion, with only 16% of that sum contributing to adaptation goals.117  
 
This was one of the most pressing issues faced by negotiators at the Paris Conference and 
has been addressed with some ambiguity in the Agreement. Article 9 of the Agreement states 
that developed country Parties ‘shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and 
qualitative information’ on projected levels of public financial resources and ‘shall provide 
transparent and consistent information on support for developing countries’, but fails to 
quantify clear adaptation finance goals (largely due to the fact that any quantified obligation 
would require the US senate to ratify the agreement). Article 9 also provides that developed 
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Parties ‘shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to 
both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the 
Convention’ and aims to set a new collective quantified goal ‘from a floor of USD 100 billion 
per year’;118 although it remains unclear which Parties will contribute how much and when.  
 
The Paris Agreement is therefore consistent in its approach to addressing adaptation, but its 
failure to stipulate how much and when countries will provide finance raises questions as to 
whether the Agreement is yet another set of ‘aspirations’ rather than realities. A ‘business as 
usual’ approach to climate finance would result in the continuation of developed countries 
failing to meet the $100 billion goal. Further discussion and debate on the issue of adaptation 
and climate finance is therefore required in forthcoming negotiations to ensure this goal is met 
and improved upon.  
 
Loss and Damage 
Loss and Damage is a contentious and sensitive issue that has not been specifically 
addressed in climate change agreements, but instead treated as a subcategory of adaptation. 
Between 1980-2004, losses from natural disasters in developing countries averaged $54 
billion per year119 and, according to a 2012 UN paper, the impacts of slow onset events include 
a rise in sea levels, increasing temperatures and other environmentally devastating events;120 
all of which are likely to have the greatest effect on developing countries. The paper considers 
that ‘addressing loss and damage associated with slow onset events and processes can 
ultimately reduce vulnerability and increase resilience’.121 It is perhaps in light of these findings 
and the strengthening presence of developing countries in COP negotiations that the Paris 
Conference was the first to treat loss and damage as a separate issue. 
 
The Agreement decided on the continuation of the 2013 Warsaw Mechanism 122  which 
promotes implementation of approaches to address loss and damage through enhancing 
knowledge and understanding of risk management, strengthening dialogue and enhancing 
action and support through finance, technology and capacity building; a promising step 
forward. However, developed countries were unwilling to have liability and compensation for 
                                                        
118 Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (‘Paris 
Agreement’), COP21, Paris, December 2015, Article 9. 
119 Ogden, P., Bovarnick, B., et al., ‘Key Principles for Climate Related Risk Insurance’, Center for 
American Progress, (2015), p.1. 
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loss and damage included in the Agreement, as it would have imposed legal responsibilities 
on Parties. This has resulted in liability and compensation being explicitly excluded from the 
Agreement.123 Shortly after negotiations, during meetings with SIDS, the US announced a $30 
million contribution to climate risk insurance initiatives in Central America, Africa and the 
Pacific to help ‘vulnerable populations strengthen their climate resilience’.124 This contribution 
forms part of the 2015 G-7 summit goal to extend insurance to 40 million people vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of changing weather patterns by 2020.125  After negotiations the UN 
Secretary General launched ‘Anticipate, Absorb, Reshape’ a new climate resilience and 
insurance initiative with the goal to provide $2 billion to around 30 developing countries to 
‘strengthen the ability of countries to anticipate hazards, absorb shocks and reshape 
development to reduce climate risks’.126 Although not part of the Agreement itself, it appears 
that climate risk insurance initiatives are an effective alternate method in enabling countries 
to cope with the effects of climate change both pre and post disaster and, if adhered to by 
Parties, the combination of the prominence of loss and damage in the Agreement and the 
separate climate risk insurance initiatives should enable developing countries to better 
manage the slow onset climate events they will face in the future.  
 
The Agreement and its accompanying decision text also make specific reference to the 
importance of sustainable development, recognising its role in ‘reducing the risk of loss and 
damage’;127 academics believe that the 2015 Agreement makes reference to sustainable 
development as a ‘context in itself’ 128  and is therefore ‘arguably the most ambitious 
sustainability policy initiative to date’. 129  Overall, global cooperation has succeeded in 
reaching a consensus on this issue more easily than anticipated; a real triumph for 
environmental justice and human rights. 
 
Emissions Reductions 
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It is widely understood that the goal to limit the increase in global temperature to well below 
two degrees Celsius is ‘the crucial element of the agreement’.130 The specific targets for 
emissions reductions under the Agreement can be found by assessing pledges made by the 
Parties in INDCs. A recent study by the Grantham Research Institute (Study 2) considers that 
in order to be effective, the mitigation pledges made in INDCs need to have three key 
interlinking attributes: ambition, credibility and feasibility as in Figure 3. 131 
 
Figure 3 The three key attributes for effective mitigation pledges: 
 
 
Feasibility (the ability to meet the costs and gain the resources for implementation) is arguably 
the most essential attribute. As without the ability to implement the intended contribution, an 
INDC will fail to be ambitious and will also lose its credibility. On the other hand, the lower the 
ambition in INDC pledges, the more feasible they will be to meet and the more credible they 
will appear. Study 2 therefore considers that the relationship between ambition, credibility and 
feasibility is ‘complex and multidirectional’.132 Prior to the 2015 Conference, the Grantham 
Research Institute issued a study (Study 1)133, which found that while there has been progress 
compared with hypothetical BAU global emissions pathways,  
there is a gap between the emissions pathway that would result from current 
ambitions…and a pathway that is consistent with a reasonable chance of limiting the 
rise in global average temperature to no more than 2 degrees C above pre-industrial 
levels.134  
 
Study 1 recommends that the mismatch between the ambitions embodied by the INDCs and 
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the 2 degree goal means that Parties to the UNFCCC should intensify ambitions. This is 
acknowledged in the Agreement itself, which states that ‘much greater emission reduction 
efforts will be required’135 than those associated with the current INDCs in order to achieve 
the 2 degree goal. As it stands, the current INDCs provided by the US and EU each focus on 
GHG emissions reduction targets. The EU has set itself a binding target of a reduction of at 
least 40 per cent by 2030 compared to 1990 levels,136 while the US has set an economy-wide 
reduction target of 26-28 per cent by 2025 compared to its 2005 level.137  
 
China has taken a different approach, aiming to peak emissions by 2030 through an intensity 
target, rather than a base year target, and focuses on GHG emissions goals and non-GHG 
goals.138 However, as discussed, it is clear that these combined efforts are currently not 
enough to meet the ultimate goal of the Agreement. While much of the debate focuses on the 
ambition of INDCs in comparison with the IPCC scenarios consistent with preventing the 
global temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius, the political credibility of these INDCs (i.e. 
whether they are reliable and achievable) and their ability to be implemented effectively is no 
less important. Study 2 considers that credible emission reduction targets promotes ‘greater 
trust among counties and stimulates upward drive in the collective level of ambition’139, thus 
creating positive dynamics between Parties. The study also considers that credible INDCs are 
more likely to attract investment, which is essential for implementation where pledges depend 
upon finance.   
 
Study 2 identifies key determinants of credibility, including: a coherent legislative and policy 
basis, a transparent decision making process, dedicated public and private bodies, a history 
of international engagement, a climate-aware public opinion and a track record of delivering 
on climate change commitments. The study scores each of these determinants for each Party 
to conclude whether they are fully, largely, moderately, slightly or not supportive to the overall 
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Nationally Determinded Contributions (INDCs) ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and 
Policy (2015), p.5. 
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credibility of their INDC. The study found that in general, the INDCs appear to score 
moderately well across all the determinants of credibility, with notable variations between 
developed and emerging economies. The latter tend to score lower on effective decision 
making processes, dedicated public and private bodies and a climate-aware public opinion 
affirming the case for attention to capacity building and adaptation in developing countries – 
as illustrated in Figure 4 Analysis of credibility for key Parties: 140. 
 
 
Scale:  
0.0.5: not supportive of credibility;  
0.5-1.5: slightly supportive;  
1.5-2.5: moderately supportive; 
2/5-3.5: largely supportive;  
3.5-4: fully supportive.141  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows that although China and India score relatively high on legislation and policy, 
their credibility is weakened by all of the other determinants, especially public opinion and 
dedicated public and private bodies. The credibility of the US pledges appear to be equally 
discouraging, despite the country’s wealth and access to resources. On the other hand, the 
EU scores either largely or fully supportive on all the determinants. Study 2 therefore highlights 
one of the key problems for the Paris Agreement and beyond; while China, India and the US 
have the highest potential for emissions reductions, their pledges to reduce are emissions are 
the least credible. The potential affect these INDCs will have on IEL and in the fight against 
climate change therefore not only depends on the content of the pledges made by Parties, but 
on their political credibility. The lack of credibility in the pledges made by the US, China and 
India casts doubt as to whether pledges will be adhered to. Furthermore, the insufficiency of 
the INDCs as a whole suggests that even if they were to be adhered to, the 2 degree goal will 
not be met anyway. 
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Conclusion 
Figures 5 and 6 show that since IEL negotiations began at the Stockholm Conference, 
emission levels from the world’s largest emitters of CO2142 have increased from 12,546 metric 
tons of carbon dioxide (MtCO2) in 1972 to 26,543 MtCO2 in 2014 (a total rise of 13,997 
MtCO2). The largest increase in emissions are in the developing countries of China and India, 
who by 2014 emitted over ten times more MtCO2 than in 1972. 
Figure 5: 143 
 
Figure 6  
144 
 
                                                        
142 Including: China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, 
the United States and the European Union. 
143 Graph created at: Global Carbon Project, Global Carbon Atlas, (no date) 
http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/?q=emissions 30 April 2016. 
144 Ibid. 
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The point is that since negotiations began, world leaders have missed out on numerous 
opportunities to prevent a dangerous increase in CO2 emissions in developing countries. 
Figures 5 and 6 show that although US and EU emissions decreased between 2002-2014, 
developing countries such as China, India, and Indonesia saw a dramatic increase in 
emissions over the same period of time. The reason for this extreme difference in emissions 
levels is clear; while IEL agreements have imposed some emissions restrictions on developed 
country Parties, they have failed to support and facilitate developing countries to develop 
sustainably and reduce emissions. Consequently, developing countries have continued to 
emit dangerous levels of CO2 at an unprecedented speed. The only party in Appendix 5 that 
has seen a significant reduction in CO2 emissions since 1972 is the EU (a reduction of 728 
MtCO2 by 2014).  
 
It must be noted that the failure to prevent a dangerous increase in global emissions is not 
necessarily due to other Parties failing to meet IEL targets. As developing countries were all 
listed as non-Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, they were subject to no targets and 
put under no obligation to reduce emissions. Furthermore, in hindsight, the global community 
can now appreciate that even if developed Parties had met their targets consistently, no matter 
how ambitious, developed country efforts alone were simply not enough to prevent a 
dangerous increase in global CO2 emissions. 
 
It is for these reasons that the Paris Agreement is so welcomed by academics and 
environmentalists. The Agreement abolished the binary split between Annex 1 and non-Annex 
1 Parties and is the first to truly address the issue of loss and damage, adaptation and 
sustainability, thus providing a realistic platform for emissions reduction in both developed and 
developing countries.  
 
The Agreement is not legally binding, but rather a hybrid of legally binding and non-legally 
binding components, with INDCs being non-binding. Article 13 of the Agreement instead 
imposes a strong transparency and accountability framework, although there is nothing to 
suggest that this will have a negative effect on compliance. In fact, Clement-Davies has argued 
that relying on transparency and peer pressure to incentivize results, rather than sanctions for 
breaches is a more pragmatic way forward145 and avoids a repeat of the mistakes of the past, 
Furthermore, while the Agreement recognises that the current pledges as set out in INDCs 
are not enough to prevent a rise in global temperature of 2 degrees Celsius, the recent 
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advances in global cooperation between the world’s three largest emitters (China, the US and 
the EU) provide optimism for the strengthening of INDCs and for the forthcoming COP22 
negotiations in Marrakesh.  
 
In conclusion, while IEL has contributed to the protection of the global environment and in the 
fight against climate change by raising a climate-aware community, strengthening 
international relations, establishing scientific bodies such as the IPCC and promoting 
sustainable development, in terms of actual goal setting and target meeting, IEL has 
essentially been aspirational rather than successful. However, it is clear that the Paris 
Agreement represents a new paradigm, bringing the global community closer than ever to an 
aspirational but achievable goal endorsed by the IPCC. In the meantime, there is still much 
work to be done to ensure that Parties strengthen and adhere to INDC pledges and that 
developing countries receive the support necessary to meet their pledges and reduce 
emissions. The next step for IEL will be to ensure strong and sustained political action both 
bilaterally and through the UN climate regime to codify the detailed rules of the Agreement 
and how they will work in practice.  
 
 
 
